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 Policy decisions at the local level of government are framed by a set of institutions 
established at the state and local levels that determine what changes can be accomplished 
and through what channels. In the study of intergovernmental relations, institutions are 
important because they shape individuals’ actions and preferences, provide stability to 
collective choices, minimize transaction costs, limit choices, affect policymakers 
behavior and preferences, and provide incentives for political exchange (Clingermayer 
and Feiock, 2001). Given this role for institutions, one can argue that any serious analysis 
of policy choices at the local level requires focusing on the role of intergovernmental 
relationships. 
However, empirical studies conducted at the local level have consistently ignored 
intergovernmental rules and institutions in the explanations provided. One policy area 
where neglect of intergovernmental institutions is particular egregious is empirical 
analysis of solid waste management. Recent efforts to explain the adoption and success of 
municipal recycling programs (Folz, 1991; Folz and Hazlett, 1991; Mrozek, 1996) have 
failed to include intergovernmental factors such as mandated recycling goals, financial 
assistance, incentives, and the role of state solid waste management comprehensive plans. 
There are few exceptions. Feiock and West (1993) develop a model of federalism to test 
the impact of state rules (mandates, financial assistance, reduction goals, incentives, and 
administration and enforcement) in the adoption of municipal solid waste recycling 
programs. The same authors (1996) also include state level goals and mandates in a test 
of the success of municipal recycling programs. Another exception is provided by Khator 
 2
(1993) who examines the impact of Florida’s state recycling law at the county level of 
government. 
History also provides a compelling reason to explore the nature of intergovernmental 
institutions. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the impacts of local policy became 
extrajurisdictional, justifying state legislation to deal with negative spillovers, collective 
action problems, and other assorted market failures. Following the call made by Burns 
and Gamm (1997) to an exploration of the link between state legislatures and local 
government, this paper helps to fill this important lacuna in theoretical and empirical 
analysis of local government policy. Even though state level rules in a given state may 
apply to all local jurisdictions, local policy choice and implementation varies across 
localities. Using state level rules as controls, this work also addresses the local/contextual 
determinants of this variation. 
 
Rationale for Local Policy Instrument Choice: 
The Tools Approach 
 
The focus of the empirical analysis in this paper is the policy instrument1 and we 
contend that local choices are made within the constraints provided by both state and 
local level rules. 
In policy areas where the local government plays an important role such as solid 
waste, economic development, and growth management, it is possible to identify a 
number of tools usually available to local officials to help them deal with each of these 
policy concerns. In addressing local policy choices constrained by state rules we employ 
                                                 
1 The concepts policy instrument, policy tool, and production technology will be used interchangeably 
throughout this paper. 
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the tools approach to highlight economic and political tradeoffs faced by local officials 
when choosing between competing alternatives. Each policy tool has its political 
economy, which makes them attractive or undesired by local officials, interest groups, 
and citizens. 
In recent years the public policy and welfare economics literatures have directed 
attention to the specific policy instruments that governments employ to purse policy goals 
(Salamon, 1989; Weimer and Vining, 1999; Peters and van Nispen, 1998; Salamon, 
forthcoming).   The tools paradigm was first proposed and explained as a field of inquiry 
by Salamon (1981) and Salamon and Lund (1989). As argued by these authors, the tools 
share a set of essential features and are generally used to accomplish the same goals. In 
other words, the tools are alternative means of accomplishing similar governmental 
policy objectives. 
While a growing literature explores how context can affect the choice of policy 
instruments, most attention has been on the comparison of markets with public 
bureaucracies. Moreover, this work has focused on national level policy to the neglect of 
instrument choices at the local level. Research on the tools of government action has 
classified a variety of instruments available to address government and market failures 
(Hood, 1983; Linder and Peters, 1989; Salamon, 1989; Weimar and Vining, 1999; Feiock 
Tavares and Stream, 2001).  While policy instrument typologies sometimes apply 
different labels to various strategies, each describes generic policy instruments used to 
address failures of markets or government to deliver goods or services.    
A wide array of policy instruments is available for implementing local environmental 
goals.  At the aggregate level, municipal solid waste programs combine various generic 
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policy instruments and reflect the interests of multiple constituencies.  In the analysis that 
follows we do not treat waste policy as monolithic.  Instead, we identify separate policy 
instruments as interventions with unique implications resulting from distinct institutional 
contexts. It is important to analyze the choice of tools in terms of what problem 
government is trying to address, what the strengths and weaknesses of each tool are in 
dealing with the problem, and what the consequences or impacts are of their use in 
specific communities. At the local level, more than any other level of government, the 
link between policies and goals is, or at least should be, clear. Policy instruments or tools 
are devices used to achieve a specific goal (Salamon and Lund, 1989). 
Policy tools will be distinguished according to both economic and political 
characteristics. Economically, tools differ on the benefits and costs accrued to the median 
taxpayer and the choice should reside in the policy instrument or combination of 
instruments producing the largest marginal benefit. In order to produce the best choice 
under a Pareto efficiency criterion, benefits and costs of the available tools should be 
examined. 
Policy instrument choice, however, cannot be reduced to an economic criterion. In 
fact, political and distributive interests are involved so that policy makers choose the 
policy tool or combination of tools which minimizes political transaction costs. 
The relevance of the tools approach to local government choices should by now be 
apparent. At the local level, the link between goals, choices, and outcomes is much more 
clear than at upper levels of governments. First, contrary to state level choices, which are 
much more general and usually address regional or statewide issues and are targeted to 
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achieve state level goals and objectives, local policy choices deal with the inherently 
local problems.  
Second, local level policy makers are able to assess the benefits and costs of each tool 
much more accurately and choose according to an economic efficiency criterion. More 
specifically, a policy instrument entails economic benefits because its adoption can 
produce savings, if the instrument is a less costly way of achieving the same goal, or 
economic costs if the reverse occurs.  
Third, the local choice is determined by local officials, interests, and constituencies 
who are much more closer to decision makers and, hence, can more easily influence 
them. Not incidentally, this also allows local officials to have a better sense of the 
political transaction costs they face in making the choice. In other words, policy 
instruments are not neutral means of accomplishing the same objectives. 
Fourth, and most significantly, state officials direct, constrain, and limit local choice 
but do not choose local policy tools. Ultimately, this decision belongs to the local 
community and this fact justifies the emphasis placed upon the relevance of local context 
in the remaining pages.      
Contrary to previous attempts to enumerate comprehensive classifications or 
taxonomies of instruments applicable to governments as a whole (Phidd and Doern, 
1978; Salamon, 1981; McDonnell and Elmore, 1986; Salamon and Lund, 1989; Linder 
and Peters, 1989), here we focus in the notion of tools available to deal with a specific 
problem in a given policy area.  
When thinking of the solid waste problem, four policy tools are considered: 
landfilling, incineration, recycling, and source reduction. Tool choice has to be placed in 
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a context, considering three essential features (Linder and Peters, 1989): the institutional 
framework within which local officials operate, the problem situation at hand which 
demands the tool choice, and the temporal context at which the choice is made. However, 
equally important for the examination of the policy choice, it is to consider the 
characteristics of the tools available and the trade-offs inherent to their adoption.  
The analysis of policy choices at the local level is then centered in the policy tool and 
on what factors determine the choice of these policy instruments. The next section 
discusses the intergovernmental factors that influence local level choice. Then, we 
proceed by highlighting the local setting where these choices take place, namely by 
mentioning the role of local institutions and rules in framing choices, the local context 
where economic trade-offs in policy instrument choice take place, and the political 
transaction costs faced by local officials when deciding between competing alternatives. 
 
Intergovernmental Rules and Local Policy Instrument Choice 
   
State level rules function as intergovernmental institutions that communicate state 
level preferences, define local roles, and establish the upper limits of local choices 
(McCabe and Feiock, 2000).  In this sense local governments are agents of the state. By 
defining legitimate actions, state rules structure how local actors approach policy 
decisions in general and shape the path of future policy choices. The direct effect of state 
level rules is mitigated by information asymmetries and political incentives.  Local 
actors, but not state policy makers know their true motivations, abilities, and propensity 
to behave opportunistically.   Local actors realize that they must comply with the rules of 
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the intergovernmental contract, and recognize where it constrains the pursuit of local 
political objectives. This, in turn can lead to a shift of policy strategies as local actors 
attempt to achieve political goals under state rules.   
The essential question presiding this kind of research is: “How do local governments 
respond to environmental policy shaped at the state level?” State laws affect the behavior 
of local actors by forcing them to comply or by making them adjust their behavior in 
order to circumvent those upper level rules. The success of state laws is largely 
dependent upon the incentives embedded in the legislation usually intended to raise costs 
of noncompliance, reduce information asymmetries, and diminish time-consistency of 
action problems (Dixit, 1996). Local policy is generated within an intergovernmental 
framework and hence partly shaped by federal and state limitations.  
Local governments are dependent upon the states for financial support, regulation, 
and in other ways. Examples of this type of impact are state level mandates that force 
local governments to comply. A mandate can be best seen as a change in policy venue in 
the sense that it denies the local government the authority to decide over a certain issue 
obliging it to comply. At the same time, the rules established at the state level constitute 
constraints that induce stability in local government performance. From the point of view 
of local governments, these upper level rules can be extremely difficult to modify for 
several reasons.  
First, rules are difficult to change because they confer advantages to certain 
individuals or groups that will oppose efforts to changes in rules detrimental to their own 
projects (Goodin, 1996). Moe (1990) contended that institutions are not only a way to 
solve problems of collective action, but also instruments of coercion and redistribution. 
 8
Thus, institutions are not neutral; they create winners and losers and induce equilibrium 
in the political system (Shepsle, 1979). 
Second, because institutions shape preferences of individuals and groups, they also 
favor the preservation of the status quo by introducing stability in social interaction. The 
first and the second argument are linked by the fact that, with a structurally induced 
equilibrium changes in the rules of the game become difficult to accomplish. 
Finally, because rules represent power differentials between individuals and groups, 
policy and institutional change happens when shifts in the distribution of bargaining 
power among individuals or groups occur. Knight (1992) argues that collective action 
costs and uncertainty costs are the obstacles facing policy and institutional emergence. 
The former type of costs refers to the difficulty in getting individuals and/or groups to 
support proposed changes, whereas the later type of costs concern the degree of difficulty 
in predicting the consequences of the intended change. When the benefits of supporting 
and enacting a given institutional or policy change exceed the costs the change is more 
likely to occur. For these three reasons we expect that local actors will face strong 
obstacles when attempting to change rules or policies defined at the state level. Does this 
mean that change in local level policies is a rare phenomenon and a hostage of federal 
and state level institutions? 
Based on the arguments presented we expect intergovernmental institutions – federal 
and state regulations, fiscal policies, and mandates – to affect political action and 
behavior at the local level. However, even if state level rules act as constraints to local 
behavior one can also expect that local governments will exhibit adaptive behavior in 
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order to pursue their self-interest engaging in what Sbragia (1996) called the politics of 
circumvention. 
Sbragia (1996) argued that throughout the twentieth century local governments 
became increasingly immersed in “…a complex framework of limitations constructed by 
state governments, state courts, and the Supreme Court.” (p. 102). To address these 
limitations, localities promoted legal, financial, and organizational strategies of 
circumvention that allowed them to pursue their own goals without violating the rules 
established by their principals.  
In the case of local borrowing, Sbragia suggests that two complementary mechanisms 
were adopted as strategies to circumvent general-obligation bond restrictions imposed by 
state governments2: the issuance of revenue bonds and the creation of public authorities. 
The two instruments are interrelated because one of the distinguishing features of a 
public authority is the ability to use revenue bonds as its major method of finance. 
In a similar vein, Burns (1994) highlighted the important role of state legislatures in 
the formation of local governments. Diverse state legislation affects the ability of cities to 
zone, prevents them from taxing neighbors, restricts annexations, constricts voting rights 
in special districts elections to property owners, and imposes diverse tax limitations.      
Empirical work has addressed the politics of circumvention by local governments. 
Principal-agent theory has been applied to interpret the adoption of state level limits on 
local taxes and expenditures (TELs) and their implications for local finances.  This work 
suggests that while TELS have reduced property tax dependence they have created 
incentives to increase revenue from fees and charges (McCabe and Feiock, 2000). 
                                                 
2 Restrictions imposed by state governments may include debt limits, and referenda requirements, among 
others. 
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Empirical work by Carr and Feiock (2000; 2001) concludes that smaller, but more 
frequent, annexations are an integral part of the adaptive behavior displayed by local 
governments facing state level constraints on annexations. From this perspective it seems 
clear that change at the local level can be hindered or at least slowed down by the 
stability of state level institutions.  
The fact that local governments are embedded (nested) in the intergovernmental 
system affects the time and scope of policy change at the local level. On one hand, when 
change takes place within the institutional constraints imposed by upper levels of 
government it is slow and incremental. On the other hand, when rules change in national 
or state level the repercussions at the local level may be dramatic and non-incremental.  
   
Local Institutions, Contextual Factors, and Policy Instrument Choice 
 
An examination of the literature focusing on policy choice at the local level reveals a 
primary concern with local contextual variables such as quasi-market competition, local 
interest groups, socio-demographic factors, and the local institutions adopted, among 
others. I begin this discussion by examining the part played by local institutions in local 
policy outcomes. 
 
The Role of Local Institutions in Policy Instrument Choice  
 
The form of government allowed by the municipal charter, the form and frequency of 
elections, the power of eminent domain, and the authority to incorporate as a 
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municipality are just a few examples of the formal institutions and rules of government 
that can influence policy outcomes at the local level (Clingermayer and Feiock, 2001). 
Fleischman (1985) pointed to the way private interests are affected by local boundary 
change. This author recommends that, besides focusing on collective action costs 
involved in bringing about local boundary change, one should also consider private 
benefits and costs that accrue to local actors. In other words, changing boundaries at the 
local level involves distributional issues that have to be examined when analyzing the 
motivations for collective action (Burns, 1994).  
A similar argument is considered by Maser (1985) when discussing the adoption and 
change of municipal charters. The author argues that changes in municipal charters are a 
consequence of citizens’ demands for political outcomes. First, local actors with policy 
preferences shape institutional rules to further those preferences (Miller, 1985). Second, 
because distributive consequences arise from the adoption or change in local level 
institutions, it is certain that local policies will be affected by these institutional factors 
(Maser, 1998).  
Because past options are the result of a certain distribution of power resources, 
information, and preferences at a given point in time, they tend to operate as institutions. 
In the same tone, Dixit (1996) argued that policy acts have long-term consequences 
because they create constituencies that benefit from the policy and will resist alternatives 
that challenge the status quo. Hence, local policy change is very much determined not 
only by local institutions but also by shifts in the balance of the power distribution. In 
order to identify changes in this distribution it is necessary to focus on the relevance of 
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contextual factors in determining local policy outcomes. This is the topic of the next 
section. 
 
The Role of Local Contextual Factors in Policy Tool Choice 
 
Contextual factors – political, economic, social, and demographic – mold local 
policies. A large body of literature based on the ideas of Tiebout (1956) has developed 
over the last forty years guided by the idea of the existence of a quasi-market for local 
public goods. The extremely restrictive assumptions of the Tiebout model include 
consumers interest maximizers making rational decisions about where to live, that is, 
citizens make “buying” decisions with their feet by moving from one local government to 
another that provides them better boundles of services. 
While other studies confirm the existence of local markets for public goods (Teske, 
Schneider, Mintrom, and Best, 1993; Schneider, Teske, Marschall, and Roch; Stein and 
Post, 1998), the criticisms of this model are intense. Lowery and Lyons (1989) concluded 
that voice and contracting are more important than the exit mechanism embodied in the 
Tiebout model. For this reason the authors argue that the choice between consolidated 
and fragmented structures does not affect the political participation at the local level. 
Whatever the side of this debate one might choose to take, it is clear that the local 
environment and market matter when dealing with policy choices. The context in which 
these decisions are made includes institutional factors, discussed in the previous 
subsection, and non-institutional factors such as business interest groups, citizen interest 
groups, race and class divisions, fiscal conditions (property tax base, rates, fees, etc.), and 
demographic variables. One last factor remains to be discussed.  
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Every time a policy decision is made, it influences future options and future decisions 
to be made by elected and appointed officials. The concept of path dependency is 
relevant for the analysis of local policy outputs because it focus on the role of history in 
determining current policies. Woodlief (1998) explained the importance of path 
dependence theory by arguing that early choices decisively affect later policy options by 
locking in preferences. For example, early choices regarding urban development and 
expansion influenced the alternatives available in later periods regarding urban mass 
transportation.  
Once following a given policy path it is extremely costly for a local government to 
revert it. These sunk costs are not only economic, but also political. If a city enacts a set 
of curbside recycling programs or implements a city pension plan it gets locked-in a self-
reinforcing policy path that is politically costly to revert. Even more difficult to correct 
are structural lock-ins such as road design or tax and regulatory policies that affect local 
retail and residential areas (Woodlief, 1998). The reason why structural lock-ins may be 
more enduring is because they involve physical modifications in the landscape that are 
much more difficult to revert. The pattern of policy change when the lock-in is structural 
will be mainly incremental since it involves infrastructures – roads, bridges, railways 
among others – already in place that might be extremely difficult, if not impossible to 
alter. As a consequence policy change is locked in a constraining path and choices are 
severely limited. 
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Solid Waste Policy Instrument Choice at the Local Level 
 
We contend that intergovernmental institutions are critical to understand local solid 
waste management. Most policy decisions are concentrated at the state and local level. 
McClain (1995) argues for an integrated approach to solid waste management at the local 
level that should rely on a combination of production technologies tailored for each 
community. This freedom in defining the appropriate combination of policy instruments 
is, as we have seen, somewhat limited by federal and state solid waste legislation. For 
example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency only provides major guidelines 
regarding national recycling goals, allowing the states large discretion in the design of 
recycling policies, establishment of goals and comprehensive planning.  In turn, recycling 
programs are carried out by county and city governments that are responsible for their 
design, implementation and, ultimately, success or failure. 
Both state and local government solid waste management practices have been 
described as a “highly fragmented patchwork of legislation” (Powelson and Powelson, 
1992). If it is possible to find some consistency or pattern across state level legislation, 
the same cannot be said for the local level, where solid waste choices are very much 
related to the local context, including cost of solid waste policy tools, industry interests, 
environmental leadership, and political commitment. 
The theoretical framework described in the preceding pages is now applied to solid 
waste management practices in the 67 Florida counties. The data set for this analysis is 
provided by Florida’s Department of Environmental Protection 
(www.dep.state.fl.us/dwm/). The description of hypotheses, variables and their indicators 
 15
follows next, divided in two subsections dealing with economic effects and political-
distributive effects upon local policy choices. Throughout both subsections the 
hypotheses pertaining to the intergovernmental aspects of local policy choices are 
highlighted. 
It is possible to focus this analysis upon several features of policy instrument choice, 
such as the number of recycling programs per capita, the total tons per capita landfilled, 
recycled, or incinerated. Current limitations of data prevent us from engaging in such an 
ambitious task. Therefore, we concentrate the empirical analysis upon the size of 
recycling programs measured as the percentage of households covered in 1998 as an 
indicator of effort to supply this specific policy tool.   
 
Production Technology Choice at the Local Level 
 
Local officials policy instrument choices can be framed as a set of management 
technologies from which they choose the appropriate combination. The choice depends 
upon the relative costs of each of the alternatives and addresses some of the factors that 
might affects these costs such as costs of disposal, economies of scale, levels of 
participation in recycling initiatives, and state level grants to local governments. 
In considering the economic trade-offs between alternative production technologies, 
officials choose the combination of policy tools which maximizes the benefits of waste 
disposal at the least cost for the median taxpayer. Ceteris paribus, as the cost of one 
alternative increases, officials are expected to substitute that alternative for another of 
lower cost. 
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The choice between the three policy tools available to manage solid waste is 
determined in large part by the relative cost of the options. It can be expected that 
jurisdictions will compare landfill and incinerator tipping fees and the administrative 
costs of recycling programs.  
Kinnaman and Fullerton (1997) found that a $1 increase from the average in the 
landfill tipping fee leads to a .78% increase in the likelihood of adopting a recycling 
program. Even though the substitution effect between the reliance on landfilling and 
recycling has been supported empirically there are a few caveats. Several authors have 
found evidence that the costs of operating curbside recycling programs exceed those of 
landfill disposal (Franklin Associates, 1994; Solid Waste Association of North America, 
1995 – both cited by Kinnaman and Fullerton, 1999). Palmer et al. (1997) reach similar 
conclusions by arguing that recycling more than 7.5% of the total amount of waste is an 
inefficient choice given that landfill disposal becomes a less costly option. 
The capacity of local landfills affects the choice of production technology. Peretz 
(1990) argued that communities facing lack of landfill capacity face pressures to look for 
alternatives to solve the solid waste management problem. The availability of suitable 
land for future landfilling also influences the choice of production technology. Overall, 
low landfill capacity will tend to increase negative externalities. Furthermore, the health 
and contamination safeguards involved in each choice will also affect the presence of 
negative externalities. In jurisdictions where there is a shortage of landfill capacity, the 
costs and possibly the negative externalities associated with landfilling are high, leading 
to increases in the scope of recycling programs. 
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Similarly, incineration involves costs and negative externalities that are pondered 
when deciding the production technology to be employed. In general, we expect that as 
the costs of recycling decrease relative to incineration costs, the larger in scope the 
municipal recycling programs will be. In accordance, Everett (1989) shows with the New 
Jersey case that, lower costs of other available options can also contribute to smaller 
programs. On the other hand, the enactment of air pollution controls on incinerators is 
likely to increase the cost of adoption of this production technology and, by that, decrease 
the relative cost of other solid waste management options. 
In order to measure economic trade-offs between solid waste policy instruments, we 
employ three variables measuring landfill, incineration, and recycling costs. Landfill and 
incineration costs are measured as the average landfill tipping fee and waste-to-energy 
tipping fee3 in each county respectively. Recycling costs are measured as the average cost 
per capita of the county’s recycling programs4. 
 The choice of production technology is also a function of population density. On one 
hand, low densities are likely to indicate more available space and an option for the 
landfilling solution. On the other hand, higher densities produce economies of scale so 
that production technologies which achieve cost savings through higher density such as 
recycling and source reduction programs are more likely to be adopted. 
Some authors have argued that the average costs of recycling decrease with the 
amount collected confirming the argument of economies of scale (Bohm et al., 1999). 
Kinnaman and Fullerton (1997) show that a community with 100 more people per square 
                                                 
3 The waste-to-energy variable was dropped due to the small number of these facilities in Florida. 
4 This variable is lagged one year to allow for readjustments in program size/coverage as a result of 
program cost. 
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mile is 4.2% more likely to adopt a recycling program. In our analysis, density is 
measured as the 1998 county population per square mile. 
A similar mechanism is thought to occur when the population of a municipality 
increases. The size of the population has been analyzed under the rationale that, as the 
population increases, the amount and diversity of recyclable materials also increases 
creating the need for solid waste programs larger in scope. Again, according to our waste 
management explanation, the costs of recycling programs will go down as the population 
gets larger, which allows for recycling programs larger in scope (Paehlke, 1993). In their 
1993 study, Feiock and West also found population to be a positively significant 
predictor of the adoption of municipal solid waste recycling programs, both in the 
need/responsive model and in the final model. Population is included in the analysis 
using the 1998 official estimates from the Florida Governor’s Office. 
Intergovernmental financial assistance to finance recycling programs alters the 
benefit/cost ratio of recycling relative to other alternatives. Grants are likely to reduce the 
relative cost of recycling when compared to other available alternatives and, for this 
reason, encourage broader recycling programs. Local governments receiving more money 
to stimulate recycling are also more likely to display higher rates in the use of this solid 
waste policy tool. Feiock and West (1993) found that state level mandates and 
intergovernmental financial assistance were significant predictors of the adoption of 
residential curbside programs. The Recycling & Education Grants provided by the state 
of Florida to its local governments for the fiscal year of 1996-97 is used to test this 
hypothesis. In addition, county solid waste expenditures per capita lagged one year is 
included to test the effect of spending upon the size of recycling programs. 
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 Policy Tools as Consumption Goods at the Local Level 
 
The choice of policy tools at the local level is also shaped by local contexts and 
institutions. Next, we address the relevance of these factors in the choice of solid waste 
policy instruments by local level government officials. 
 
Policy Instrument Choice and Political Benefits: Citizens, Interest Groups, and Entrepreneurs 
 
At the local level, the role of interest groups involved in environmental policy is 
particularly salient given that the proximity to decision makers and local officials is 
higher hence increasing the ability to have their claims attended. Better than at the state 
level, government officials are able to choose the combination of policy alternatives or 
tools that maximizes electoral benefits and minimizes ideological costs. In order to 
accomplish these goals, the consideration of the socio-economic make up and context of 
the local community is crucial in determining the combination of policy tools. 
Neighborhood associations and environmental interest groups are likely to be more 
active in opposing the presence of a landfill in the jurisdiction because of potential for 
decreased property values (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 1999; Nelson et al. 1992).  
On the other hand, local commitment to the environment is expected to increase the 
likelihood of the adoption of curbside recycling. Tawil (1995 – cited in Kinnaman and 
Fullerton, 1999) found that the probability of adoption increases by 4% with a 1-
percentage point increase in the number of households belonging to an environmental 
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interest group. Using county data, Mrozek (1996) concluded that pro-environmental 
voting was a statistically significant variable in predicting curbside pick-up adoption. 
Other empirical studies confirm the expectation that the presence and influence of 
environmental support in a given municipality associated with recycling programs larger 
in scope and the performance of recycling programs (Feiock and West, 1993; 1996).   
A similar argument can be made for landfills and waste-to-energy plants (WEP) 
operated either by private entities or the government of the jurisdiction. If, in a given 
jurisdiction, the percentage of solid waste diverted to a landfill or WEP is large, it is 
probable that the owners and operators of these businesses will oppose recycling. Clearly, 
owners and operators of landfills and waste-to-energy plants are likely to resist the 
adoption and expansion in size of recycling programs because these will negatively affect 
their income and survival. To measure the opposition to recycling we employ the number 
of private landfills per capita in each county. 
One can expect that the socio-demographic make up of a jurisdiction will have a role 
to play in the mix of policy tools adopted by that community. Previous findings indicate 
that wealthier, more educated, and more liberal communities recycle more. 
Two arguments indicate a positive relationship between income and solid waste 
management prevention strategies such as recycling and source reduction. On one hand, 
wealthier citizens are more likely to support local government prevention strategies 
because they associate these options with an increased quality of life. On the other hand, 
wealthier citizens wish to avoid the harmful consequences of the presence of a landfill or 
incinerator in their community that may depress property values. These individuals, who 
are more likely to be property owners, will also have more space required by recycling 
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activities. Several empirical pieces confirm the positive association between income and 
recycling (Feiock and West, 1993, 1996; Berger, 1997; Kalan and Feiock, 2000; Tavares, 
1999; 2001). To test this hypothesis we employ the county per capita personal income as 
reported by the Florida Statistical Abstract for the year of 1998.  
The association between education and prevention strategies is also generally thought 
to be positive, not only because more educated citizens and communities are expected to 
be more environmentally conscientious hence favoring recycling and source reduction 
over other alternatives, but also because they will more easily recognize the 
environmental costs entailed by landfills and waste-to-energy plants. Using nation-wide 
data of 909 communities, Kinnaman and Fullerton (1997) find that the likelihood of a 
jurisdiction adopting curbside recycling increases by 0.86% with a one-percentage point 
increase from the average in the percentage of individuals with a bachelor degree. The 
effect of education attainment on the size of recycling programs is measured as the 
percentage of county’s population with high school diploma in 1998 with the data being 
retrieved from the Florida Statistical Abstract. 
In order to test the positive association between citizen liberalism and the size of 
recycling programs we employ the percentage of county population voting for the 
Democratic Party in the 1996 presidential election.  
  
Administrative and Decision Making Costs 
 
At the local level, the equivalent to state legislative opportunity costs are 
administrative costs. Recycling programs require large amounts of both financial and 
human resources (Wiseman, 1992). Their size will therefore increase as the amount of 
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resources devoted also increases. The county solid waste expenditures per capita is used 
as an indicator of administrative costs incurred by the county in managing solid waste. As 
spending increases, the coverage of recycling programs is also expected to increase. 
 
Commitment Costs, Sunk Costs, and Path Dependency 
   
The minimization of political transaction costs by local officials is largely determined 
by local contexts. The presence and predominance of interest groups favoring one or 
several of the policy instruments will affect the degree to which elected officials can 
commit to a given choice. The minimization of commitment costs forces officials in 
communities with a large number of recycling establishments to adopt preventive 
strategies rather than relying on landfilling and incineration. In our analysis we use the 
number of recycling centers and facilities per capita operating in a county as an indicator 
of environmental interest group strength. 
Commitment to a given mix of policy tools inevitably generates sunk costs because 
resources are invested in programs, facilities, and equipment and cannot easily be 
retrieved. For this reason, larger reliance on a single strategy will make it more difficult 
for government officials to switch to other strategies. 
Finally, the earlier the commitment to a strategy, the more difficult it will be to 
change tools. As an example, local governments that relied earlier on recycling are also 
likely to have higher recycling rates being that age and size of the program should be 
good predictors of these rates. Here, we employ state recycling and education grants per 
capita lagged up to seven years to test the link between past practices and current size of 
recycling programs. 
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The Effect of Local Institutions: Form of Municipal Government and System of Elections 
 
The form of government is also included in this analysis under the contention that 
political preferences for expanded recycling will be most influential under mayor-council 
governments. 
Mayor council (unreformed) governments are more likely to adopt recycling 
programs larger in scope due to the political attractiveness of this option. It is our 
contention that, in local governments with unreformed governments, the programs will be 
larger in scope because politicians will have incentives to pursue allocative efficiency and 
be more responsive to political demands.  
On the other hand, counties with reformed governments are less likely to adopt 
recycling programs with a broad scope of materials. Council-manager governments have 
less of an incentive to adopt recycling programs for political reasons. In the council-
manager type of government, high-powered incentives are not as pervasive as in the 
mayor-council type. Managers may only choose to adopt programs large in scope if the 
benefit-cost ratio of this option exceeds those of other alternatives. In other words, city 
managers are more concerned with efficient waste disposal. Hence, the decision 
concerning the size of programs is not related with citizens’ demands or lobbying 
activities but with professional considerations of managers and their perceptions of the 
public interest. These incentives are described as low-powered and result from the 
appointment of a manager as chief executive. 
The council manager variable is a dummy, which takes the value of “1” for counties 
using this form of government and “0” otherwise (Commission and Council Elected 
Executive forms of government). An interaction term is included to capture the combined 
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effect of the council manager form of government and the cost of landfilling upon the 
size of recycling programs.  
The system of election is commonly thought to affect the pattern of policy instrument 
choice among local governments. District based elections are frequently associated with 
the distribution of benefits to local constituencies by local officials that are able to target 
these benefits to specific groups. Our analysis includes a dummy variable (“1”=District 
election and “0”=Otherwise) to account for the impact of the electoral system upon 
recycling program size. The coefficient should be positive. Table I summarizes the 
independent variables included in the empirical analysis. 
 
(Table I about here) 
 
Estimation Procedures 
 
The number of observations in the analysis is 66. Duval County was dropped from 
the estimation due to missing data. The interaction term described in the previous section 
was dropped due to crippling multicollinearity problems. The inclusion of a variable 
addressing the form of election was compromised due to lack of reliable data for the 
Florida counties. An attempt was made to estimate the model with data available for 24 
counties, but the coefficients become unstable and the variable was dropped. 
We proceed by estimating an ordinary least squares model with robust standard errors 
correcting for heteroscedasticity. Next, we estimated seven other models where the only 
variable changed was recycling and education grants. The variable was lagged one 
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additional year in each estimation. The results of these estimations are reported in Table 
II and discussed next. 
 
Empirical findings 
 
The overall model performs reasonably well by explaining 49 percent of the variation 
in the dependent variable. The results confirm the impact of institutions upon the size of 
recycling programs. The form of government variable is statistically significant at the 
90% confidence level. In counties where the council manager form of government is 
adopted the percentage of households covered by recycling programs is, on average, 
higher by approximately 20 percentage points, holding the other variables constant and 
controlling for the effect of recycling program cost5. 
 
(Table II about here) 
 
Equally important result is provided by the recycling and education grants variable. 
State grants contribute to an expansion in size of recycling programs. Each additional 
dollar per capita distributed by the state of Florida to its counties increases the percentage 
of households covered by 8 percentage points. As previously stated, this variable uses 
data of the recycling and education grants for the 1997-98 fiscal year. In order to test the 
idea of path dependency, we lagged this variable as many years as data was available for 
the Florida counties. The results are presented in table III. 
                                                 
5 An alternative estimation of the same model employing the interaction term (council manager * landfill 
tipping fees) results in a positive but non-significant coefficient, indicating that the hypothesis that, 
managers will prefer recycling when landfilling is an expensive option does not receive empirical support. 
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 (Table III about here) 
 
The results are remarkable in that all the lags are statistically significant at least at the 
90 percent confidence level, even when one looks at grants provided seven years before. 
In terms of path dependency and distributive consequences this means that counties 
receiving more financial support seven years before present recycling programs with 
larger coverage in 1998. In other words, the impact of early choices lingers for years in 
terms of solid waste options.  
Other results are worth mentioning. Counties with a one-percentage point higher 
educational attainment have, on average, recycling programs covering two percentage 
points more households. Population is positive and significant but the substantive impact 
is very small. In counties with ten thousand more inhabitants, recycling programs cover, 
on average, 0.3 percentage points more households. This should come as no surprise, 
given the expectation of economies of scale present in these programs. The density 
variable is also significant but with a negative sign. This is a surprising result and 
difficult to justify because it contradicts our expectations indicating the presence of 
diseconomies of scale6. 
Another unexpected result is the negative effect of recycling centers and facilities on 
the coverage of recycling programs. One reason may account for this fact. Since we are 
attempting to measure the effect of environmental interests upon recycling choices, it is 
reasonable to argue that quantity of establishments does not equate to strength of 
                                                 
6 Due to the strong correlation between the population and density variables, we re-estimated the model 
dropping the population variable, but density is still negative, barely missing statistical significance.  
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recycling interests. In fact, the opposite effect may be occurring. The smaller the number 
of establishments the better they may organize to make their interests prevail. At this 
point, data to measure the size of these establishments is not available since our data 
presents an aggregate number that includes drop-off centers, materials recovery facilities, 
buy back centers, and recovered materials processing facilities. However, in the presence 
of a large quantity of establishments one can expect that some positive impact will occur 
in the size of recycling programs. To account for this possibility, we included a squared 
term of the environmental interest group variable and, as expected, the sign of this 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
Of the remaining variables, income, partisanship, local solid waste expenditures, and 
landfill tipping fees have positive, albeit non-significant, effects upon recycling program 
size that partially confirms our expectations. 
 
Conclusions 
  
The empirical analysis of recycling programs in the Florida counties provides 
moderate support for our theory. The assertion that past choices regarding solid waste 
management influence, if not determine, present options is largely confirmed. More 
importantly, the use of state government grants to stimulate recycling seems to produce 
the desired result, at least in terms of recycling program coverage. 
The results also confirm the relevance of local institutions in policy instrument 
choice. However, the unequivocal finding that council-manager governments are 
characterized by higher rates of recycling coverage is surprising and denies commonly 
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accepted ideas that electoral incentives drive mayor-council governments’ policy choices. 
Future attempts to determine the impact of the form of government upon local policy 
choices should focus on the important interaction effects that may be occurring between 
this variable and the relative cost of policy instruments. Because our efforts to do so 
result inconclusive, one can think of this as an additional reason to push for further 
research. 
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Table I 
Variable Measurement and Predicted Coefficients 
 
Variable Description Predicted 
Coefficients 
Economic Effects   
Population Office of the Governor 1998 estimates  + 
Density Population per square mile + 
Solid waste amount Tons per capita + 
Landfill Costs Landfill tipping fees + 
Recycling Costs (t-1) Recycling program cost per capita - 
Local Solid Waste Expenditures (t-1)  Local solid waste expenditures per capita + 
Electoral Benefits   
Income Personal income per capita + 
Education Percent population with high school or above + 
Partisanship Percent Democrat (1996 Presidential election) + 
Environmental interest groups Recycling centers and facilities per capita - 
Environmental interest groups (^2) Squared term + 
Landfill interests Landfills per capita - 
Institutional Variables   
Form of Government Dummy variable (1=Council Manager 0=Other) +/- 
Form of Election Dummy variable (District =1 At Large =0) + 
State Recycling Grants State recycling and education grants per capita + 
 
Table II 
Local Solid Waste Management Analysis 
Dependent Variable: Percent of Households Covered by Recycling 
Variable Coefficients Robust Std. Err. t-statistics 
Economic Effects    
Population .000 .000 2.50 
Density -.019 .005 -3.80 
Solid waste amount -.565 12.3 -.046 
Landfill Costs .178 .336 .528 
Recycling Costs (t-1) -.117 .250 -.468 
Local Solid Waste Expenditures (t-1)  .138 .163 .847 
Electoral Benefits    
Income .001 .001 .489 
Education 2.30 .945 2.43 
Partisanship .725 .665 1.09 
Environmental interest groups -.551 .251 -2.20 
Environmental interest groups (^2) .002 .001 1.87 
Landfill interests .940 1.12 .842 
Institutional Variables    
Form of Government 20.4 11.8 1.73 
State Recycling Grants 8.15 3.20 2.55 
N=66 
F=7.45 (Prob. >F = 0.000) 
R^2= 0.49 
   
Constant -192.3 76.23 -2.52 
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Table III 
Lag Coefficient t-statistic 
R&E Grants (t-7) 4.22 1.73 
R&E Grants (t-6) 4.45 1.84 
R&E Grants (t-5) 5.02 2.02 
R&E Grants (t-4) 4.81 1.75 
R&E Grants (t-3) 5.26 1.64 
R&E Grants (t-2) 6.06 2.00 
R&E Grants (t-1) 6.62 1.94 
R&E Grants (t) 8.15 2.55 
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